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INTRODUCTION
Legal interpretation is an increasingly prominent feature of
national governance in Latin America. This development is certainly
evident with respect to high profile judicial decisions. It has also
become a major topic of legal academic debate. There are a number
of reasons this is so. Beginning in the mid-1980s, many countries
adopted new constitutions or constitutional reforms with
significantly expanded fundamental rights and basic guarantees.
Some of these new or amended charters introduced separate
constitutional tribunals, greater constitutional review in existing
courts, and additional procedures for constitutional claims.
Additionally, many countries established judicial councils to make
the judiciary more independent and to sanction official misconduct.
As a result, increased public discussion of judicial action is driven at
least in part by these material changes.
During roughly the same time period, graduate legal studies in the
United States have become increasingly popular, not only for Latin
American business lawyers and political leaders, but also for scholars
and academics. In the past, the latter usually headed to continental
Europe for advanced degrees. Now increasing exposure to AngloAmerican legal culture has resulted in a greater focus on adjudication
and its related set of concerns, among which legal interpretation is
central. Additionally, beginning in the late 1980’s, the second wave
of legal development assistance from the United States and
international sources has significantly focused on modernizing the
judiciary, transferring not only technical expertise, but also judicial
ideology and culture.
Finally, some Latin American law schools have begun hiring
larger numbers of full-time faculty members, a significant change
from the previously near-exclusive reliance on practicing lawyers.
Some schools are substantially investing in junior faculty by
providing incentives for graduate studies and research stays abroad.
Some of these schools have created masters and doctoral programs, a
relatively new development, for locals not willing or able to leave
home. Many of these institutions are looking to their faculty
members returning from foreign studies or graduate programs to lead
these new offerings.
This expanded pool of local scholars, graduate students abroad,
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diasporic Latin American academics, and engaged Latin
Americanists constitutes a significant and growing discursive
community. Its members intervene not only in comparative law
fields in the global North, but also in legal-political debates within
individual Latin American countries. As a result, the surging interest
in legal interpretation is not solely attributable to the wave of recent
constitutional and legal reform, it is also the product of a growing
critical mass of engaged participants, a newly shared stock of AngloAmerican legal literature, and certainly the expectation that public
debate and academic interventions can produce tangible effects.
Clearly, specific exchanges over questions of legal reasoning vary
from country to country, especially given the diversity of actual
issues at stake, the multitude of theories or approaches in play, and
the sometimes unexpected political alignments of transnational
sources and local politics. Common to much of the region, however,
is the “turn to legal interpretation” and the field of discourse it
designates, marking a shift away from traditional legal reasoning and
its accepted methods. Whether debating nuevo derecho in Colombia,
principiologia in Brazil,1 the proportionality principle in Mexico,2 or
plurinational legal hermeneutics in Bolivia,3 the background
framework for these discussions is much the same: new interpretive
theories are marshaled against the conventional practices of national
courts and traditional commentators, which are in turn dismissed as
pure legal formalism.4
1. See Leonardo García Jaramillo, El “Nuevo Derecho” En Colombia:
¿Entelequia Innecesaria O Novedad Pertinente? [The “New Law” in Colombia:
Unnecessary Entelechy or Pertinent Novelty?], 29 BARRANQUILLA 289, 292
(2008) (Colom.) (noting that “nuevo derecho” refers to a series of theoretical and
dogmatic transplants); Padua Fernandes, A reflexão sobre os princípios no direito
[Reflection on the Principles of Law], 6 PRISMA JURÍDICO 11, 11-14 (2007) (Braz.)
(identifying the similar role that general, judicial, and moral principles share as
sources of law).
2. Imer Flores, Towards a Glocal Jurisprudence: Comparative – and
Transnational – Constitutional Reformation and Interpretation in Mexico (2010)
(presented at the XVIIIth International Congress of the International Academy for
Comparative Law, Washington, D.C., July 2010) (on file with American
University International Law Review).
3. See generally BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, REFUNDACIÓN DEL ESTADO
EN AMÉRICA LATINA: PERSPECTIVAS DESDE UNA EPISTEMOLOGÍA DEL SUR
[REFOUNDATION OF THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA: PERSPECTIVES FROM A
SOUTHERN EPISTEMOLOGY] (2010).
4. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE
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The present Essay begins to explore this background dichotomy of
the current legal interpretation debates. At first glance, Latin
American “interpretationists” seem merely to be echoing the legal
realists in their opposition to formalist legal thought. Upon further
inspection, however, it becomes clear that, by taking as their foil an
aberrational Latin American legal formalism, interpretationists are
simply reproducing the common diagnosis of pervasive legal failure
within the region. This Essay argues that, in doing so, the new
interpretation may yield some significantly self-defeating and
unintended effects. Admittedly, the many examples and case studies
the topic fully merits are not possible in this short piece. To begin
this discussion, nonetheless, Part I briefly identifies the salient
features of the new interpretation. Part II summarizes the sources of
the failed law background against which it is conducted, drawing on
some of my earlier work. Finally, Part III indicates various
drawbacks of the new interpretation, highlighting its dependence on
the failed law concept.

I. THE NEW INTERPRETATION
The “new interpretation,” as defined here, is not limited to any one
mode whether historical, constructivist, sociological, or
hermeneutic.5 It is also not confined to a single area, such as
interpreting constitutions, codes, or other legal texts, although
SIÈCLE 105-07 (1997).
5. My intention is not in any way to emphasize so-called “interpretive”
approaches at the expense of others in my discussion of interpretationism, since
they are only some of the many new theories. On interpretivism, see Mark
Tushnet, The Possibilities of Interpretive Liberalism, 29 ALTA. L. REV. 276, 27677 (1991) (exploring political theory through the interpretation of political culture
and noting that a new liberal political theory arose out of the lack of “legitimacy of
the liberal state”); on hermeneutics, see NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 30 (2d
ed. 2008) (explaining Hart’s hermeneutic way of analyzing legal jurisprudence
through the lens of moral and political philosophy); on a sociological approach, see
Mauricio García Villegas, No Sólo De Mercado Vive La Democracia: El fenómeno
del (in)cumplimiento del derecho y su relación con el desarrollo, la Justicia y la
democracia [Democracy Does Not Survive Solely on the Market: The Phenomenon
of (Non)Compliance with Rights and Its Relation to Development, Justice, and
Democracy], 6 REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA INSTITUCIONAL 95, 95-134 (2004)
(Colom.). See generally CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 22-25 (1996) (discussing how interpretation is
necessary to fill logical gaps in constitutional law, such as how the right to life in
the Argentine Constitution is inferred from other clauses).
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constitutional questions are clearly the most prominent.6 Overall, the
new interpretation presents additional elements for legal reasoning,
such as the application of neutral principles; the utilization of past
facts of a legal, social, or historical nature; and the introduction of
consequentialist thinking. Thus, the reference here to new
interpretation or interpretationism does not denote any single
perspective. Instead, it is meant to capture the wide array of
discussions across the region about national governance through
interpreting law and legal texts.7 It signals a newer, heightened
consciousness about legal reasoning.

A. FROM APPLICATION TO INTERPRETATION
Historically, national legal communities in Latin American states
have constructed their local legal discourse in deeply transnational
ways.8 The common observation that Latin America is part of the
civil law tradition, or a member of the Romano-Germanic or
continental European legal family, is primarily an outward sign of
the embeddedness of this transnationalism within the region’s
national legal systems.9 The paradigm of European transnationalism
can be analyzed in its different historical moments and from its
different theoretical underpinnings, such as natural law, positivism,
6. See generally Dante Figueroa, Current Constitutional Developments in
Latin America, INT’L LEGAL RESEARCH INFORMER (ASIL) 8-18 (Summer 2011),
available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/IG/Informer_Summer_2011.pdf.
7. I use the terms “new interpretation” and “interpretationism”
interchangeably to refer to this academic and expert discourse about legal
reasoning in, or related to, Latin America.
8. See generally Alejandro M. Garro, Shaping the Content of a Basic Course
on Latin American Legal Systems, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 595, 599
(1988) (signaling the influence of French, Spanish, German, and Italian law in
Latin America).
9. See generally PHANOR J. EDER, A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF ANGLOAMERICAN AND LATIN-AMERICAN LAW 4 (1950) (describing the history of civil
law systems by illustrating how the Roman law influenced Latin American law by
its reliance on statutes and the legislature); RENÉ DAVID & JOHN E. C. BRIERLEY,
MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 81-82 (2d ed. 1978) (explaining how the RomanoGermanic source of civil law expanded to the “western world”); JOHN HENRY
MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ–PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 42 (3d
ed. 2007) (examining how interpretation within the judicial system in civil law
countries is criticized as an abuse of discretion by the courts).
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and legal sociology.10 In sum, its effect is to generate legal analysis
and legal scholarship which, in their most reputable forms, are
commonly performed by citing and commenting upon prominent
continental European authorities. Local legal-political positions are,
as such, expressed in this particular language of foreign and
comparative sources.
To date, a few jurisprudential studies have been produced about
the workings of this traditional mode of legal reasoning and
argument in Latin America.11 Significantly, the most important
results of this work show that it is not merely copying or unthinking
and random uses of foreign texts. Still, the practice may indeed lead
to some unintended consequences because of the quite indirect ways
that local policy objectives are expressed.12 At its most basic level,
this European-inflected transnationalism offers a mode of taking
positions on local questions of law without appearing to be engaged
in mere politics. It provides arguments and models for legislative
reform and institutional change, and it legitimizes action and
discretion by local legal officials. Law, seen in this way, is thus not
simply the winning side of local political struggle or conflicting
beliefs. Rather, it can be portrayed as more broadly transnational, if
not plausibly universal.
Regarding judicial decision-making, John Merryman and Rogelio
Pérez-Perdomo have noted the great anxiety it produces:
This evolution [of courts’ acceptance of the power of interpretation] has
also been accompanied by an enormous amount of discussion and writing,
some of it to justify interpretation of statutes by courts, some of it to
10. See Josef L. Kunz, Introduction to LUIS RECASÉNS SICHES ET AL., LATINAMERICAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY xix (Gordon Ireland et al. trans., 1948) (placing
jurisprudential theories in historical context, contending that natural law was
predominant in eighteenth century France, positivism in nineteenth century
continental Europe, and sociological jurisprudence in early twentieth century Latin
America); see also Jorge L. Esquirol, The Fictions of Latin American Law (Part I),
1997 UTAH L. REV. 425, 441 (1997).
11. See Garro, supra note 8, at 602 (explaining how few scholars, other than
those in political science, economics, or sociology, are willing to research Latin
American institutions because these institutions are seen as “underdeveloped and
backward”).
12. See generally DIEGO EDUARDO LÓPEZ MEDINA, TEORÍA IMPURA DEL
DERECHO: LA TRANSFORMACIÓN DE LA CULTURA JURÍDICA LATINOAMERICANA
[THE IMPURE THEORY OF LAW: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE LATIN AMERICAN
JURIDICAL CULTURE] (2004).
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define the limits of the interpretive power, and some of it to specify how
that power should be exercised. The mass of scholarship on interpretation
in civil law countries (which is roughly analogous to the mass of literature
in the United States on judicial process) thus is in part an expression of
uneasiness over the fact that courts are interpreting statutes, and in part an
expression of anxiety that they will abuse their power of interpretation;
only a small proportion of it focuses on the actual process of
interpretation . . . . Only a few writers have tried to give the judge help in
facing up to particular problems of interpretation. 13

The new interpretation addresses this “actual process” directly. It
takes the leap from discussions about applying the law—the
traditional mantra in civil law systems—to debates about outright
interpreting it. Accordingly, it brings legal reasoning practices into
sharp relief.14 Methods and theories for correct and singular legal
13. MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 9, at 42.
14. See, e.g., Everaldo Lamprea M., Derechos Fundamentales y Consecuencias
Económicas [Fundamental Rights and Economic Consequences], 8 REVISTA DE
ECONOMÍA INSTITUCIONAL 77, 84 (2006) (Colom.) (claiming that independent
theories that conceive rights as procedural criteria or restrictions which are to be
observed above all other considerations are incomplete); Valéria Ribas do
Nascimento, A Filosofia Hermenêutica Para Uma Jurisdição Constitucional
Democrática:
Fundamentação/Aplicação
Da
Norma
Jurídica
Na
Contemporaneidade [The Hermeneutic Philosophy for a Democratic
Constitutional Jurisdiction: Substantiation/Application of the Rule of Law in
Modernity], 5 REVISTA DIREITO GV 147, 147-168 (2009) (Braz.) (recognizing the
valorization of constitutional jurisdiction as a contributing source to the
development of theories for judicial interpretation); see also Víctor Alberto
Quinche Ramírez, Los sistemas jurídicos y la teoría del razonamiento judicial: una
lectura de H.L.A. Hart [Juridical Systems and the Theory of Judicial Reasoning: A
Lecture of H.L.A. Hart], 5 REVISTA ESTUDIOS SOCIO-JURIDICOS [ESTUD. SOCIOJURID.] 257, 257 (2003) (Colom.) (contrasting Hart’s concept of rights with
Dworkin’s interpretation of norms); Sergio Estrada Vélez & Julián García
Ramírez, Algunas reflexiones en torno a la necesidad de una teoría del derecho y
de los casos difíciles acorde al contexto del Estado constitucional colombiano
[Some Reflections Surrounding the Necessity of a Theory of Rights and of Hard
Cases According to the Context of the Constitutional State of Colombia], 8
OPINIÓN JURÍDICA 97, 98 (2009) (Colom.) (exploring the social and constitutional
rule of law model and the obstacles it faced in the Colombian context); Pilar
Zambrano, El Derecho como práctica y como discurso: la perspectiva de la
persona como garantía de objetividad y razonabilidad en la interpretación [Law
as a Practice and Discourse: The Perspective of Personhood as a Guarantee of
Objectivity and Reasonableness in Interpretation], 23 DÍKAION 109, 111 (2009)
(Colom.) (arguing that although “the teleological projection of law” creates
problems in legal interpretation “it also constitutes the limit or framework for the
creative dimension of interpretation”).
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outcomes are its central focus. In the new interpretation, prestigious,
transnational theories, especially from the United States and the
United Kingdom, are its primary sources.15

B. SUPPORTING NEO-CONSTITUTIONALISM
The impetus for legal interpretation is quite intelligible. It
accompanies a recent trend in Latin America of progressive
constitutional decisions and reformist legal constructions, part of the
broader global trend of neo-constitutionalism.16 Of course, a turn to
15. See, e.g., Margarita Cepeda, Dworkin: un mal lector [Dworkin: A Bad
Reader], 6 REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS SOCIALES 123, 124 (2000) (Colom.); Daniela R.
Ikawa, Hart, Dworkin e Discricionariedade [Hart, Dworkin and Discretion], 6
LUA NOVA: REVISTA DE CULTURA E POLÍTICA 97, 97-113 (2006) (Braz.)
(distinguishing between H. L. A. Hart’s positivist theory and Ronald Dworkin’s
constructivist theory in their application to the question of judicial discretion in
cases of legal lacunae); Luis Villavicencio Miranda, Algunas Críticas a la Idea de
Razón Pública Rawlsiana [Some Critiques of the Idea of Rawlsianan Public
Reasoning], 23 REVISTA DE DERECHO 533, 533-57 (2009) (Chile); Victor Manuel
Rojas Amandi, El Concepto De Derecho De Ronald Dworkin [The Concept of
Rights According to Ronald Dworkin], 246 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE
DERECHO, UNAM 355, 355-56 (2006) (noting that Dworkin’s theory was
developed through judicial analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court); Javier Saldaña,
¿Derechos Morales O Derechos Naturales? Un Análisis Conceptual desde la
Teoría Jurídica de Ronald Dworkin [Moral Rights or Natural Rights? A
Conceptual Analysis from the Juridical Theory of Ronald Dworkin], 90 BOLETÍN
MEXICANO DE DERECHO COMPARADO 1207, 1209 (1997) (mentioning Hart and
Dworkin, along with John Rawls and A. Macintyre, as the most influential authors
in this area); José Alberto Tamayo Valenzuela, La Teoría del Derecho de H.L.A.
Hart [H.L.A. Hart’s Theory of Rights], 237 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE
DERECHO, UNAM 219, 220 (2002) (Mex.). But see Guillermo Lariguet, Conflictos
Trágicos Genuinos y Respuesta Correcta en torno a algunas ideas de Ronald
Dworkin [Genuine Tragic Conflicts and the Correct Response in Light of Some of
Ronald Dworkin’s Ideas], 246 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO, UNAM
205, 206 (2006) (Mex.) (placing more emphasis on Jon Elster’s work related to
solomonic justice).
16. My particular use of the term neo-constitutionalism is meant to refer to the
actual decisions of courts in Latin America. See generally CARLOS NINO, THE
CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1996); Mauricio Barberis,
Neoconsticionalismo, Democracia, e Imperialismo de la Moral, 31 JURÍDICA,
ANUARIO DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD
IBEROAMERICANA 325 (2001) (Mex.); see also David Landau, The Two Discourses
in Colombian Constitutional Jurisprudence: A New Approach to Modeling
Judicial Behavior in Latin America, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 687, 709-10,
733 (2005) (discussing different forms of reformist theories in Latin America, such
as traditionalism-positivism and constitutionalism, and describing the situation in
Colombian constitutional adjudication as one where “[a] summary of some
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judicial lawmaking need not lead inexorably to progressive political
results. It could promote any number of ends.17 Still, much recent
constitutional change and judicial action has advanced social justice
and progressive causes.18 Discussing this phenomenon, Jorge Correa
Sutil reflects:
The judiciary, which in the Latin American tradition has not been an
important forum for the underprivileged to voice their demands, may
finally become, under the new conditions, an important place to advance
social justice . . . . At the same time, using the judiciary to advance
socioeconomic rights represents serious risks, especially in countries
where judges are not accustomed to hearing arguments based on social
science data or foreseeing the general effects that a particular decision
produces on society.19

Notably, the sorts of reasoning that produce these social justice
outcomes are not typically perceived as keeping within the normal
bounds of conventional Latin American judicial practices.20 New
theories and methods thus offer the promise of consolidating greater
fundamental rights and guarantees by legitimating different forms of

important cases since 1991 demonstrates the generally liberal bent of recent
jurisprudence, as well as its connection to new constitutionalist interpretative
methods”).
17. See, e.g., Landau, supra note 16, at 735 (exemplifying the use of judicial
interpretations to criminalize abortion based on a judge’s interpretation of the right
to life over the rights of a mother).
18. See Allen R. Brewer-Carías, Vice President, Int’l Acad. of Comparative
Law, General Report on Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators in
Comparative Law 21 (July 27, 2010), available at http://www.allanbrewer
carias.com (search “Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators,” follow first
search return link) (summarizing country reports from a host of participating
national reporters, such as constitutional courts creating human rights
jurisprudence based on their constitutions).
19. Jorge Correa Sutil, Judicial Reforms in Latin America: Good News for the
Underprivileged?, in THE (UN)RULE OF LAW AND THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN
AMERICA 255, 269-70 (Juan E. Méndez et al. eds., 1999).
20. See MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 9, at 39 (explaining how
“[t]o the civil law fundamentalist, authoritative interpretation by the lawmaker was
the only possible kind of interpretation”); see also Landau, supra note 16, at 70910 (describing how “[t]raditional-positivism is still the dominant outlook within
Latin American societies; carriers of the new constitutionalism perceive it as being
something quite new and different within Latin America, part of a transnational
network of high-level academic/judicial discourse moving towards expansive
constitutionalism”).
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legal reasoning in general.21
Thus, the allure of new interpretation lies in its perceived ability to
defend results not otherwise easily accepted. Yet in any individual
case, an interpretive theory could serve either to defend or to critique
a specific legal position or judicial opinion. No single theory would
likely legitimate all, or any, specific product of neoconstitutionalism. Still, this discursive field, generally, affirms that
proper forms of interpretation exist, even if there is disagreement
over methods and application. Further, it openly expands legitimate
legal decision-making beyond logical deduction from law texts.
For example, Dworkininian interpretivism allows for variation in
judicial decisions while still maintaining that a Herculean judge
could find the predominantly correct answer from among the
differing values contained in legal precedents.22 Likewise, Hartian
hermeneutics recognizes the open texture of language, yet still limits
results within a penumbra of social meaning.23 As such, the field has
the overall effect of defending alternative forms of legal reasoning as
defensible law, even if some individual cases may end up not being
interpreted correctly. In this way, the new interpretation supports
neo-constitutionalism generally, whether or not particular decisions
by the courts faithfully follow any single approach.24

21. On the other hand, in Venezuela constitutional court supremacy has
effectively eroded international human rights protections and freedom of
expression.
22. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225-74 (1986)
(comparing legal interpretation in the common law tradition to writing a chain
novel stating, “[the Herculean judge] knows that other judges have decided cases
that, although not exactly like his case, deal with related problems; he must think
of their decisions as part of a long story he must interpret and then continue,
according to his own judgment of how to make the developing story as good as it
can be.”).
23. See MACCORMICK, supra note 5, at 29 (noting that Hart’s attempt bridges
linguistic philosophy and legal theory by “reconciling scientific and commonsense
modes of thought”).
24. See Conrado Hübner Mendes, Judicial Review of Constitutional
Amendments in the Brazilian Supreme Court, 17 FLA. J. INT’L L. 449, 450 (2005)
(contending that “[t]he constitutionalist has a crucial role within a constitutional
democracy [and] [a]bove all, he is expected to offer sound arguments for the
protection of fundamental rights, not in the courts alone, but also in the various
institutional spaces which form the public sphere.”).
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C. THE UNDERLYING STRUCTURE
Much of the new interpretation shares an underlying structure. It
rests on a defining distinction, pitting conventional legal practices in
Latin America against alternative, transnational interpretive theories.
Usually it is reasonable to distinguish between practice and theory,
and, in fact, it is quite common. It is also not unreasonable to
consider local practices in light of foreign experiences. More
curiously, though, the new interpretation is structured around a
somewhat different dichotomy: it typically juxtaposes an
unrelentingly formalist Latin American practice against idealized,
post-legal-realist reconstructive theories of liberal law in the global
North. The poles are thus neither simply theory and practice, nor
horizontal comparisons of Latin America and the global North.
Indeed, the common critiques of liberal legalism are stressed in
Latin America, while transnational interpretive theories appear to
offer effective practices. Within this dynamic, conventional local
forms are thus automatically rejected or simply ignored in favor of
aspirations to, e.g., Dworkinian interpretivism, Hartian hermeneutics,
or Alexian principles.25 This arrangement may serve as a useful
catalyst for interpretation discourse but is quite counterproductive to
reinforcing the standing of law in the region. I have described in
earlier work how the rather permanent critique of legal failure in
Latin America is partly the product of a projection of internal
critiques of liberal law everywhere as an exceptional, external
diagnosis of Latin American national legal systems in particular. 26
Considering the critiques simply reflect inherent limitations of
liberalism, however, they are never fully remediable from a
committedly legal realist perspective.27 Such a hyper-realist
characterization of failure is constantly available to argue for a
change in laws and legal institutions. In the context of the new
interpretation in Latin America, it appears that the image of legal
failure is once again at work, providing the specific springboard for
25. ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Julian Rivers
trans., 2002); DWORKIN, supra note 22; H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d.
ed. 1994).
26. See generally Jorge L. Esquirol, The Failed Law of Latin America, 56 AM.
J. COMP. L. 75, 109-16 (2008) (analyzing the ways in which academic discourse
has contributed to the portrayal of Latin American law as “failed law”).
27. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975) .
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interpretationist discourse. The section below describes the sources
of this failed law background in more detail.

II. THE FAILED LAW BACKGROUND
The turn to legal interpretation can be seen, ironically enough, as a
response to the very pronouncements of Latin American legal failure
advanced by “law and development” writings. The latter have
significantly influenced comparative law scholarship and various
other disciplines focused on the region.28 Specifically related to the
legal culture, the conventional development view portrays Latin
American legal reasoning as an anachronistic and impoverished form
of Western legal analysis. It also presumes that in the global North
modern versions of legal analysis are effectively operational. As I
have argued, this standard assessment can be understood as the
aggregate of images and characterizations marshaled in favor of or
against different projects of legal politics.29 They stand as
instrumental constructions that have been advanced and have taken
hold to further historical and current attempts to change law and
legal institutions. This instrumental image, while effective to
advocate for law reform, has significant downsides.
“Interpretationists” appear to rely on and reinforce this same
diagnosis of law’s failure in the region, while reproducing idealized
versions of liberal law elsewhere as actually practicable and
operational. While such idealized results are hardly attainable, at
least within our current state of human limitations, their
unsatisfactory effects are projected and amplified onto Latin America
as an argument for reform. Projecting these constant limitations of
the system onto Latin America has been a successful rhetoric for
triggering law reform.30 It comes at the high cost, however, of
28. See Esquirol, supra note 26, at 112-14 (arguing that scholars continuously
paint a picture of “Latin American legal failure”).
29. I have written extensively about these topics before. My focus in the past
has been to describe the central paradigms that serve principally for transnational
legal politics in Latin America, specifically the Europeanness of Latin American
law and alternatively the failure of liberal legalism in the region. Additionally, I
have demonstrated how these paradigms are mirrored internally in Latin America
and have concrete effects in terms of local legal politics. In this Essay, my focus is
to demonstrate how this same framing is also part of the legal interpretation
discourse in the region and portends some troubling results.
30. See id. at 76 (linking the images of Latin American law as “ineffective and
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consolidating a constant image of the failure of liberal legal models
in Latin America. Each new round of reform conducted in this way
further entrenches the same negative perceptions. The subsections
that follow lay out the sources of the legal failure diagnosis and
summarize some of my earlier work.

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The past fifty years have seen a significant rise in exchange
between the United States and Latin American states in the legal
sphere. This exchange is chiefly due to funding of initiatives by the
U.S. government, U.S.-based foundations, and U.S.-influenced
international organizations. These efforts have generally been
grouped together and described as the “law and development”
movement.31 In the extensive literature on the topic, scholars have
noted the movement’s different phases, changing political
orientation, and general theoretical presuppositions.32 For the most
part, however, the phenomenon has been addressed primarily from
the supply side of the equation.33 The focus has been on the types of
projects funded, their political economy, and the objectives of
funding organizations. Scholars have also expounded on the mostly
inappropriate” and Latin American judges as “inefficient and corrupt” with
development agendas created to increase human rights protections and reform
criminal procedure and the judiciary in the region).
31. See John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the
Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM.
J. COMP. L. 457, 457-67 (1977) (discussing how the “law and development
movement” developed in the 1960s and involved law reform through societal
changes, social engineering, and foreign assistance).
32. See, e.g., id. at 484-89 (providing a bibliography of 125 works written on
Law & Development); THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL 120 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (explaining how
the law and development movement in the U.S. “exported styles of legal
pragmatism and antiformalism” to developing states); José E. Alvarez, Promoting
the “Rule of Law” in Latin America: Problems and Prospects, 25 GEO. WASH. J.
INT’L L. & ECON. 281, 281-82 (1991) (focusing on the Administration of Justice
Program that the United States employed to promote the rule of law and
development in Latin America during and after the Cold War). See generally
JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID
IN LATIN AMERICA (1980) (providing a detailed history of the U.S.-led, early law
and development movement in Latin America).
33. See e.g., David Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the
Study of Law and Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1, 6-9 (1972) (arguing that “modern
law” is a prerequisite for economic and political development).
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tacit legal theories underlying these efforts, primarily an uncritical
faith in the effectiveness of the U.S. legal system and its positive
correlation with economic growth.34 At the same time, others have
noted the imperial nature of these assumptions and designs. 35
Additionally, attention has been directed to the actual beneficiaries of
these projects, both governments in power and specific individuals
who may benefit from the resources and clout they offer.36

B. THREE DIFFERENT PERIODS
In terms of specific projects, three different periods are generally
noted, including the original 1960-70’s developmental state round,
the 1990’s neo-liberal round, and the more recent social justice
moment.37 In the 1960-70s, the funding organizations were either the
U.S. government or U.S. based foundations, specifically the United
States Agency for International Development (“USAID”) and the
Ford Foundation. The objective in this first round was state-led
growth, planning and control by regulatory agencies, and
government reallocation of resources.38 It was supported by
34. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The New Development: Can American Law
and Legal Institutions Help Developing Countries?, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 767, 767
(1972) (discussing the appropriateness of U.S. legal structures in the assistance of
developing social welfare in both the United States and abroad); Lawrence M.
Friedman, On Legal Development, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 12 (1969) (declaring
that American legal imperialism is never criticized with regards to “its sense, its
propriety, its rationale” in promoting economic development).
35. See generally GARDNER, supra note 32; David M. Trubek & Marc
Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law
and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062, 1063-64
(proposing that doubts regarding legal development projects’ contributions have
led to “self-estrangement” by failing to promote equality and freedom). In the
latter article, note that Trubek problematizes many of his earlier ideas regarding
the exportation of instrumental law to developing countries.
36. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN
AMERICAN STATES 48 (2002).
37. See generally David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third
Moment in Law and Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical
Practice, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL, supra note 32, at 1-18 (describing each movement beginning with the
1960s and the role of the state including the 1980s and the neoliberal law reform,
the 1990s and economic development, and today’s social welfare movement).
38. See Franck, supra note 34, at 772 (informing that conventionally, to
establish growth in industry, the state should promote “national unification [and]
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Keynesian economics, placing the state as the principal agent of
development. The objective in the legal sphere was a pragmatic state
regulatory law, capable of effectively implementing government
planning and transcending vested private rights with the potential to
impede government action.39 Outwardly, legal development
assistance was introduced as part of state modernization.40 Early
projects emphasized improving legal education and consequently the
legal culture.41 Developmentalists believed the right prescription was
American-style legal realism and policy-oriented lawyering.42 In fact,
the creation of stable and viable communities and markets,” which lead to social
welfare).
39. See David Kennedy, The “Rule of Law,” Political Choices, and
Development Common Sense, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 32, at 95, 104 (suggesting that the more detailed
disputes concerned with “legislative and administrative positivism” were less
important than the general principle that the state should implement regulatory
schemes). But see Diego López Medina, El Sueño Weberiano: Claves para una
Comprensión Constitucional de la Estructura Adminsitrativa del Estado
Colombiano [The Weberian Dream: Keys to Constitutional Comprehension of the
Administrative Structure of the Colombian State], REVISTA DE DERECHO PÚBLICO,
June 2006, at 3, 30-33 (discussing the Colombian constitutional reform of 1968
and decentralization).
40. See generally Marc Galanter, The Modernization of Law, in
MODERNIZATION: THE DYNAMICS OF GROWTH 153, 154-56 (Myron Weiner ed.,
1966) (offering eleven features of modern law—uniform, transactional,
universalistic, hierarchical, bureaucratic, rational, professional, technical,
amendable, political, and separate from the legislature and executive—which must
be developed and sustained as a part of modernization).
41. See, e.g., Edward A. Laing, Revolution in Latin American Legal Education:
The Colombian Experience, 6 LAW. AM. 370, 371 (1974) (explicating that the
Colombian liberal-professionalism period promoted legal education, medicine, and
engineering); John Henry Merryman, Law and Development Memoirs I: The Chile
Law Program, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 481, 481-85 (2000) (indicating that the purpose
of the legal education program in Chile was to create a foundation of legal
professionals who would in turn help the legal infrastructure); Henry J. Steiner,
Legal Education and Socio-Economic Change: Brazilian Perspectives, 19 AM. J.
COMP. L. 39, 39 (1971) (stating that the “purposes, content and methods” of legal
education are affected by society’s perceptions of the law); see also Claudio Souto,
Sociology of Law: A New Perspective in Brazilian Legal Education, 58 ARCHIV
FÜR RECHTS UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 237, 243 (1972) (stressing the importance of
socio-juridical theory and research classes that were offered in Brazil to
promulgate legal education).
42. See generally Carl A. Auerbach, Legal Development in Developing
Countries: The American Experience, 63 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 81, 81-90
(1969) (describing the development of the U.S. legal system in areas such as
antitrust, consumer rights, and workers’ rights).
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in the first period, the main focus was to transform Latin American
law schools along U.S. lines.
In the late 1980s and 1990s neo-liberal round, more international
organizations became involved, many of them following the lead of
the United States or U.S.-controlled entities.43 These organizations
included the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank,
and early donors like the Ford Foundation and USAID. Additionally,
European Union and European national agencies have more recently
participated in projects of this type, albeit less in Latin America than
in Africa and the Maghreb.44 This second period was dominated by
43. See, e.g., Maria Dakolias, The Judicial Sector in Latin America and the
Caribbean: Elements of Reform 3-6, 64-71 (World Bank, Technical Paper No. 319,
1996) (discussing the relationship between economic development and judicial
reform in Latin America, and recommending that the World Bank and other
development institutions support the efforts of local governments and NGOs to
promote procedural and structural reforms in the judiciary); LINN A.
HAMMERGREN, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE AND JUSTICE REFORM IN LATIN
AMERICA: THE PERUVIAN CASE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 21-25 (1998)
(explaining that the United States and other funders were attracted by the
“progressive, humanistic reform” taking place in Latin American countries in the
mid-1990s); Fernando Carrillo, The Inter-American Development Bank, in JUSTICE
DELAYED: JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 149-154 (Edmundo Jarquín &
Fernando Carrillo eds., 1998) (presenting the Inter-American Development Bank’s
activities in the region, including a program in Colombia to increase the capacity
of the Office of the Public Prosecutor); WILLIAM C. PRILLAMAN, THE JUDICIARY
AND DEMOCRATIC DECAY IN LATIN AMERICA: DECLINING CONFIDENCE IN THE
RULE OF LAW 163-175 (2000) (critiquing the incrementalist approach to legal
reform advocated by international development agencies, and highlighting failures
of this strategy in El Salvador, Brazil, and Argentina); Thomas Carothers, The
Many Agendas of Rule of Law Reform in Latin America, in THE RULE OF LAW IN
LATIN AMERICA: THE INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION OF JUDICIAL REFORM 4-16
(Pilar Domingo & Rachel Sieder eds., 2001) (identifying four main types of “rule
of law aid” in Latin America including democracy-building, economic
development, human rights, and transnational crime prevention, and arguing that
the expansion of assistance programs in recent decades has led to competing
agendas).
44. For discussion of German investment in Chile, see James M. Cooper,
Competing Legal Cultures and Legal Reform: The Battle of Chile, 29 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 501, 527-36 (2008) (describing Germany’s financial and technical
assistance in reforming the Chilean Criminal Procedure Code as one example of
Germany’s strong influence over Chile’s legal culture). See also Máximo Langer,
Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of Legal Ideas from
the Periphery, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 663-64 (2007) (detailing investments by
Germany and Spain to expand economic development in Latin American
countries, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua).
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neo-classical economics with its focus on free markets, privatization,
and de-regulation. Accordingly, the principal objectives for law were
the protection of private property, enforcement of contracts,
regulation of securities markets, and enforcement of criminal law. At
the same time, human rights concerns and access to justice for the
poor also figured into the agenda of second wave developmentalism,
especially during its early years.45
The first two periods of law and development funding had very
different economic theories driving them. The third more
contemporary moment arises from the backlash against orthodox
neo-liberalism.46 The response on the part of donors has been to
incorporate more social justice and minority rights concerns within
their project funding priorities.47 Whether this change is significant
or alters any of the main underlying propositions of neo-liberal
developmentalism remains to be seen.

C. DEVELOPMENT TRANSNATIONALISM
An alternative way of conceptualizing law and development, other
than as a succession of projects and periods, is as a separate
paradigm of transnationalism. It can be usefully compared to the
more traditional European legal transnationalism described above.48
Structurally, the projects fit a somewhat different pattern. Rather
than a common legal family as in European transnationalism, the
45. See Carothers, supra note 43, at 10-11 (observing that international donors
have begun directing assistance at grassroots human rights groups as a way to
address inequality in Latin America); Sutil, supra note 19, at 269-70 (noting that,
historically, poor or marginalized groups have not viewed the judiciary as a
legitimate forum for their issues, but acknowledging that such groups have recently
capitalized on judicial reform in several Latin American countries to bring public
interest claims).
46. See Trubek & Santos, supra note 37, at 10 (illustrating that law and
development and neoliberalism were efforts to promote “free market ideas of
classical legal thought”).
47. See generally Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: SecondGeneration Reforms and the Incorporation of the Social, in THE NEW LAW AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 32, at 203, 203-09
(highlighting the recent shift in development policy towards incorporating social
objectives such as health and education as an economic growth strategy, and
analyzing how this new agenda both shapes, and is shaped by, social and human
rights issues).
48. See supra Part I(A).
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guiding image is foreign assistance by developed to lesser-developed
countries, whereby donors sponsor legal change in countries lacking
developed law.
In this way, law and development provides an alternative logic for
reasoning about the law. It can propel very differently-oriented
projects on its account.49 It also can draw on various legal theories
for justification and redounds to the benefit of governments and
individuals capable of mobilizing its resources. Law and
development promotes prosperity and democracy, namely economic
and political development, through better versions of law or the rule
of law, tout court. The many conflicting political aspirations of
societal actors all appear equally attainable simply through the right
mix of positive law, public institutions, and legal culture.
Development transnationalism offers a legal terrain in which to work
out the problems of poor economies, human rights violations, and
deficient democracy.
Thus, as an epistemic construct, development transnationalism
provides a rationale for a wide range of legal change at the level of
positive law, legal institutions, and legal reasoning. It orients this
activity under the rubric of promoting development, and it provides
significant legitimacy by the weight of foreign and local experts,
international organizations, and scholarly consensus. Additionally, in
Latin America, transnationalism is a historically accepted and
privileged driver of legal change. Indeed, the historical deep-seated
roots of European transnationalism as a mode of legal reasoning and
legitimization pave the way for different modes of transnationalism,
such as this form of development transnationalism.

D. FAILED LAW
Notably salient within the paradigm of development
transnationalism is the counterpoint image of the poor quality of
legal systems in Latin America. And yet, in many Latin American
countries, law and legal institutions are well-developed elements of
national social systems. Latin American states are not lacking in law,
in fact some say there may be too much of it. There are abundant law
schools and law graduates. Political leaders and government officials
49. See, e.g., Carothers, supra 43, fig. 1.1 (illustrating the wide array of actors,
agendas, and institutions involved in law and development projects).
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often have legal training. Moreover, law and legal discourse from
Europe and the United States have been primary tools of governance
over these countries’ nearly two-hundred years of independence.
As such, law and development’s main tenet that the existence of
law is central to prosperity and democracy would seem to call for a
better explanation in Latin America. There, the legal systems, while
extensive, have ostensibly failed to deliver. As a first hypothesis, a
diagnosis pointing to the absence of Western conceptions of liberal
law is not really plausible. As noted above, Latin American societies
are steeped in Western law, and legal institutions pervade much of
society.50 Instead, the common diagnosis of legal failure more
typically points to the type of Western or liberal law and legal
institutions in Latin America.51
This explanation, however, is assembled in some very peculiar
ways. The general diagnosis suffers from at least three different
types of flaws. First, particular problems or issues in one location are
generalized and projected onto Latin America as a whole.
Conclusions are based less on detailed empirical and contextual
analyses than on overall assertions about commonalities. Thus, for
example, the adversarial system and oral hearings have been
promulgated as the proper solution for both weak law enforcement in
Colombia and insufficient protection of defendants’ rights in Chile,
implicitly conflating the issues into one generic critique of Latin
American criminal procedure.52 In both cases, the solution is
propelled by the purported, all-around superiority of the
development-supported adversarial system.53
50. See supra Part I(A).
51. See, e.g., Esquirol, supra note 26, at 106-07 (noting the common neodevelopment critique that Latin American criminal procedure is too “inquisitorial”
and therefore less democratic than the U.S. model).
52. See generally Michael R. Paul, Wanted: Criminal Justice – Colombia’s
Adoption of a Prosecutorial System of Criminal Procedure, 16 FORDHAM INT’L L.
J. 608, 610 (1992/1993) (blaming impunity in Colombia on the country’s
“antiquated justice system,” the inquisitorial model); Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra
Cousino, Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Systems: The Rule of Law and Prospects for
Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile, 5 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 323, 325-26 (1998)
(listing lack of an independent judiciary, delay, and lack of judicial power over the
police as additional problems arising out of the inquisitorial system in Chile).
53. But see Langer, supra note 44, at 667-69 (arguing that Latin American
activists thought critically about the reforms, looking to a plethora of European
codes in the drafting process and choosing to incorporate only those ideas that best
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Second, units of analysis stemming from particular political or
cultural preferences in the United States or the North Atlantic are
applied to the Latin American context indiscriminately.54 The
nonexistence of that same political or cultural combination in some
places in Latin America is then used to show an institutional failure.
For example, proponents of a law and development perspective may
prefer constitutional change through judicial interpretation rather
than through amendments or new constitutions, even though it is not
necessarily clear that one is preferable to the other. Indeed,
diametrical judicial re-interpretations of constitutional law may
shake public confidence in the rule of law, especially in populations
not thoroughly imbued in liberal legal ideology. Yet in Latin
America, constitutional change through new texts is often
characterized as evidence of constitutional failure.55 To give another
example, the lobbying of lawmakers and regulators by regulated
industries is deemed perfectly legal in the United States, but the
practice of ex parte communications with judges in many Latin
American legal systems is often seen as evidence of corruption.56
While in some cases the legality in the one and corruption in the
other may be clear, the difference is not universally obvious. These
are just some of many other possible examples.

E. ENDEMIC ELEMENTS OF FAILURE
The two types of flaws, described above, can be considered
problems of insufficient context and narrow functionalism. There is
another type of flaw, however, that is more difficult to correct:
internal critiques of classical legal theory in the West are used to
reveal the “deficiencies” in Latin American law in a manner that
fit “the needs of Latin America’s social and political reality”).
54. See GARDNER, supra note 32, at 4 (critiquing American legal assistance to
Latin America as “a rather awkward mix of goodwill, optimism, self-interest,
arrogance, ethnocentricity, and simple lack of understanding”).
55. See, e.g., Keith S. Rosenn, The Success of Constitutionalism in the United
States and its Failure in Latin America: An Explanation, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 1, 7, 20-30, Appendix A (1990) (citing the fact that Latin American
republics have promulgated an average of 12.65 constitutions per country as
evidence of the failure of constitutionalism in Latin America, and identifying
reasons for this failure, inter alia, the failure of economic integration, a lack of
“real revolutionary change,” and the “imported flavor” of the constitutions
themselves).
56. Dakolias, supra note 43, at 35-36.
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portrays these perceived deficiencies as specific or intrinsic to Latin
America.57
First, Latin American law is often portrayed as “backward,” in the
sense that its legal culture is perceived as being dominated by
positivism and conceptual formalism in a manner that is reminiscent
of the past in the West.58 Additionally, the theories of a handful of
European jurists are believed to represent “the whole of legal
consciousness in the region.”59 Notably, ideas commensurate to legal
realism and pragmatic legal reasoning are believed to have not yet
arrived.60
The second major critique is the gap between law and society in
Latin America. The gap refers to the distance between the law
57. On internal critique, see generally Joseph William Singer, The Player and
the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 10-14 (1984) (explaining
that internal critique is a mode of challenging the internal logic of traditional legal
theory, and giving the following example of an internal critique of determinacy: if
traditional legal theorists and judges are correct that legal doctrine is outcome
determinate, then by their own standards, the rule of law does not exist in systems
that allow for judicial discretion). To understand traditional critiques of Latin
American law, it is useful to review the classical critiques of liberal legal theory.
See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 3-7 (1992) (noting the Progressive
attack on the “orthodoxy of the old order,” namely Classical Legal Thought, and
explaining that the Progressive critique sought to both undermine the notion that
law is neutral and make law more relevant to modern society); DUNCAN KENNEDY,
THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 261 (1975) (noting that legal
realism’s central project was to highlight the inconsistency between judicial
activism under the due process clause and the corresponding claim by judges that
applying law is a neutral and apolitical process).
58. For an overview of such critiques, see Jorge L. Esquirol, Writing the Law of
Latin America, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 693, 705-07 (noting that the focus of
these critiques is always on replacing “outdated” or overly formalistic Latin
American laws and institutions, rather than on engaging with those that are
currently in place). The image of Latin America as “formalist” is not unlike
classical legal thought or Lochnerism in the United States. Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). See generally PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM
POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V. NEW YORK 1-5 (1990) (introducing the
Lochner decision and explaining the U.S. Supreme Court’s turn to “economic
policymaking”).
59. See Esquirol, supra note 58, at 707 (2009) (providing the example of
Austrian legal scholar Hans Kelsen).
60. See, e.g., John Linarelli, Anglo-American Jurisprudence and Latin
America, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 50, 77 (1996) (noting the hesitance of Latin
American scholars to embrace legal realism despite the influence of U.S. law in the
region).
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practiced by ordinary people and the law on the books,61 a
disjuncture which is deemed inordinately wider in Latin America
than elsewhere.62 One of the most salient images about law in the
region is that it is both pervasive in development writing63 and
supported by various works of legal history and social science.64
Notably, this notion is deployed by many different camps, both more
traditional scholars and legal pluralists alike, the latter possibly
influenced by their interest in elevating the stature of particular group
law relative to the law of the state. Moreover, some progressive
scholars have described the gap in terms of the symbolic versus
61. See id. at 54-60 (describing the conflict between the rules that govern the
informal sector and the official legal system in Latin America, namely that the
formal system serves elite interests leading most Latin Americans to ignore it); see
also KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN
AMERICA: A CASE BOOK 58 (1975) (asserting that various “historical and cultural
factors” are to blame for this disparity, including “idealism, paternalism, legalism,
formalism, and lack of penetration”).
62. See KARST & ROSENN, supra note 61, at 58 (calling the gap “notoriously
large”).
63. See, e.g., Mariana Hernández Crespo, A Systemic Perspective of ADR in
Latin America: Enhancing the Shadow of the Law Through Citizen Participation,
10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 91, 92-97 (2008) (arguing that, although Latin
American law purports to protect citizens, neither courts nor alternative dispute
resolution enforce these laws effectively, and concluding that participatory
lawmaking is essential to strengthening dispute resolution systems in Latin
America); Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil’s Legal Culture: The Jeito Revisited, 1 FLA.
INT’L L.J. 1, 2-5 (1984) (describing, as evidence of the gap between law and
society, the jeito, a Brazilian way of “coping with the formal legal system” by
bending or bypassing law in established and culturally acceptable ways to achieve
a just result). See generally Jorge L. Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin
American Law, 55 FLA. L. REV. 41, 53-57 (2003) (highlighting the emergence of
development strategies in the 1960s and 1970s to address the “wide rift” between
state law and social practice in Latin America, including legal reform, legal
education, and the increased examination of values and actors within the informal
sector).
64. See, e.g., M.C. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORY OF PRIVATE
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN SPANISH AMERICA 235-38 (2004) (describing the gap
between law and practice as “a perplexing problem for historians of Latin
American law and . . . a frustrating reality for citizens” and surveying a variety of
views about this gap); Miguel Schor, Constitutionalism Through the Looking Glass
of Latin America, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 5-6, 14-24 (2006) (linking the gap between
law and practice in Latin America to the history of law’s subordination to political
and economic power in the region). But see Esquirol, supra note 26, at 79-80
(arguing that the common view that a gap exists between written and practiced law
in Latin America constitutes an instrumental argument providing fuel for
development reform proposals).
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operative value of law, a perspective which critiques socially
responsive legislation on the basis of its frustrating inefficacy.65
Third, Latin America is viewed as importing culturally
inappropriate European law. This element of the diagnosis is not
unrelated to the measure of the gap between law and society; it
figures as one explanation for the gap. Essentially, though, it is the
flip side of Latin America’s historical European legal
transnationalism, which serves a number of functions and can be
seen as simply a different sort of transnational paradigm. Within the
alternate development paradigm, it becomes one of the elements of
the diagnosis of malfunction. Indeed, from this perspective, the deep
engagement in European transnationalism is one of the sources of
legal failure in the region.
A fourth oft-echoed critique is elite control of the law. This
observation may express a more radical point about liberal law in
capitalist societies: it can mean that the rule of law simply masks the
true sources of power in society. In its development version, it
conjures the particular salience of a Latin American oligarchy in
control of the state, and it functions as an indictment of that sector of
society resistant, for one reason or another, to proposed legal
changes. Further, development reformers often denote it as lack of
“political will” by the powers-that-be. This position conceives
development reform as technical improvement up against illegitimate
self-interest, lethargy, or ignorance. It ignores the political and
distributional stakes inherent in both existing law and reforms, and it
groups together those that may be politically or economically
opposed with those simply standing to lose ill-gotten rents. However,
not in all cases is resistance to a particular legal change exclusive to
the elites, just like not all law reform benefits the poor.
In short, statements of the above-type are well-known critiques
found in the history of jurisprudence in the United States and in
Europe.66 In the development context, they are more often expressed
65. See, e.g., Claudia Fonseca, Inequality Near and Far: Adoption as Seen
From the Brazilian Favelas, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 397, 397-404 (2002)
(evaluating the potential of the newly enacted Children’s Code to regulate
clandestine adoption in Brazil, in light of Brazil’s history of passing legislation
that, while touted by the international community as highly progressive, in reality
has little impact on the lives of ordinary Brazilians).
66. See generally HORWITZ, supra note 57, at 9-10 (discussing broadly the
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in the U.S. vernacular. For example, the backwardness of law can be
traced to Oliver Wendell Holmes’s observations about law in the
United States in his article, The Path of the Law.67 Holmes expressed
the need of every generation to update its law in its own language
and in terms of its own uses.68 Scholars note Holmes’s role as a
precursor to legal realism and a critic of formalism.69 Critiques of
conceptual formalism in the United States were a mainstay of legal
realists in the 1920s and 1930s in the United States.70 Realism
sparked a loss of faith in logical abstraction at the level performed by
the then-reigning classical legal thought.71 Abstract principles were
as a result no longer generally believed capable of rendering concrete
results in specific cases.72 Further, the gap between the law on the
books and law in action commonly is attributed to Roscoe Pound and
his sociological jurisprudence.73 Here was yet another attempt to
history of American legal thought and highlighting the struggle against the
“autonomy of law,” which had lost touch with society); KENNEDY, supra note 4, at
78-79 (comparing the development of American and European jurisprudence).
67. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457
(1897).
68. See id. at 468-69 (“It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule
simply persists from blind imitation of the past.”).
69. See William Fisher, Oliver Wendell Holmes, in THE CANON OF AMERICAN
LEGAL THOUGHT 23 (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III eds., 2006)
(discussing the advances Holmes made in the discourse and debate about legal
theory, such as by advocating that judges analyze the law through the perspective
of social welfare as opposed to “fairness”).
70. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 824, 842-43 (1935) (criticizing questions
posed by functionalists as meaningless and proffering realistic jurisprudence as a
much more useful method of examining legal theory).
71. See KENNEDY, supra note 57, at 261 (discussing how the criticism of
private law concepts as “illusory” or inoperative became an attack on the logic of
the entire legal system).
72. See John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L. Q. 17, 25
(1924) (“A large part of what has been asserted concerning the necessity of
absolutely uniform and immutable antecedent rules of law is in effect an attempt to
evade the really important issue of finding and employing rules of law, substantive
and procedural, which will actually secure to the members of the community a
reasonable measure of practical certainty of expectation in framing their courses of
conduct.”).
73. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12,
15-18 (1910) (illustrating “the distinction between legal theory and judicial
administration” with reference to the Lochner case, employer liability, and the
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unseat the mechanical or formalist jurisprudence. Gap studies also
became popular in the 1960s by scholars of law and society. 74 They
were a welcome accompaniment to the bold constitutional changes
of the Warren court.75
These critiques or positions within jurisprudence have their
analogues in the civilian tradition. Indeed, it is an interesting
question of intellectual history to note their often contemporaneous
popularity on both sides of the Atlantic. Critics of formalism such as
Rudolf von Jhering and François Gény can be seen to express similar
ideas to legal realists and sociological jurisprudes in the United
States.76 Other parallels include the French juristes inquiets critics of
legal exegesis, of which Gény was one, the German Free Law
movement, sociological functionalism, and critical social theory.77
police practice of interrogating criminal suspects).
74. See generally David Kennedy, Stewart Macaulay, in THE CANON OF
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 69, at 447, 454-456 (explaining the
growth of the Law and Society movement and mentioning the emphasis on
examining the gap between law and society, such as between contract law and
actual commercial practice).
75. See David M. Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Life of the
Law and Society Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV 1, 8, 27-28 (1990) (introducing
the law and society movement and the movement’s link to politics and expansion
of rights).
76. FRANÇOIS GÉNY, METHODE D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT
PRIVÉ POSITIF: ESSAI CRITIQUE [METHODS OF INTERPRETATION AND SOURCES IN
POSITIVE PRIVATE LAW: CRITICAL ESSAY] (2d. ed. 1954); see also Duncan
Kennedy & Marie-Claire Belleau, François Gény aux Etats Unis [François Gény
in the United States], in FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MYTHES ET RÉALITÉS [MYTHS AND
REALITIES] 304-08 (Yvon Blais ed., 2000) (discussing Gény’s influence on U.S.
thinkers such as Holmes, Pound, Cardozo, and other critics of “Classical Legal
Thought”).
77. See Marie-Claire Belleau, The “Juristes Inquiets”: Legal Classicism and
Criticism in Early Twentieth-Century France, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 379, 386-24
(outlining the internal and external critiques of the jurists inquiets and their vision
that law continually evolve to meet social needs); Thomas C. Heller, Structuralism
and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REV. 127, 128-131 (1984) (explaining critical social
theory as a form of structuralism, which provides concrete theories on “cultural
institutions”); James E. Herget & Stephen Wallace, The German Free Law
Movement as the Source of American Legal Realism, 73 VA. L. REV. 399, 416-17
(1987) (summarizing the main tenets of the German Free Law movement as
skepticism towards traditional methods of legal interpretation, a belief in the
indeterminacy of law, acknowledgement of the “creative function” of the judge in
rendering just decisions, and a belief that judges should consider non-legal sources
and “the social consciousness of the community”); KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 66
(distinguishing sociological functionalism from the distributive approach in that
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Some of these jurisprudential commonalities have already been welldescribed by comparative scholars, while others remain to be more
fully explored.
Whether in Anglo-American legal jurisprudential terms or civilian
ones, these positions are predominantly internal arguments within
modern systems of law.78 Historically, they can be traced to
particular political contexts with real stakes.79 Over time, they can
also be seen to support particular positions in contests over legal
decisions and institutional design. In this way, they are part of the
repertoire of legal political argument, often deployed in favor or
against particular positions on legal policy, positive law, legal
institutions, and constitutional adjudication.
Each of these critiques may have been, at one time, potentially
devastating attacks on the legitimacy of the existing legal system, but
for the most part they are currently normalized features of liberal
legal discourse. Moreover, in the development context, these
critiques serve not for revolution but for much tamer policy change
and distributional reallocation within the limits of liberal law.
Internal critiques of liberalism, turned into diagnosis and reformist
rhetoric, usher in reforms consisting of other versions of liberal law
with different positive law rules, institutional design, and historic or
cultural origins. As such, the source of these critiques can never be
fully rectified or eliminated through the types of reforms proposed.
They nonetheless constitute the basis for the general diagnosis of
legal failure, which provides the rationale for policy change.

F. CRITIQUE OF FAILED LAW DIAGNOSIS
This general diagnosis of Latin American law thus consists of a
series of proto-typical arguments of legal politics. For example, law
is always susceptible to charges of needed updating. Conceptual
the former analyzes the function of legal institutions in resolving disputes, while
the latter examines how legal institutions impact disputes). See generally Rodolfo
Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1, 3 (1991).
78. See supra notes 57-77 and accompanying text.
79. See generally HORWITZ, supra note 57, at 3-7 (connecting various
constitutional revolutions and shifts to political crises, such as the World War I
move away from progressivism to realism, and the World War II trend towards
conservativism among realists).
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formalism is an inherent dimension of logical reasoning and its total
elimination is impossible. What we find to be logically convincing
may only be phenomenologically produced. In other words, there is
no clear dividing line between determinacy and indeterminacy.
Rather, convincing arguments are more clearly a product of shared
experience varying from reference group to reference group.
Additionally, the gap between law and action is axiomatically ever
present. While there may be some rules more closely followed than
others, a full society-wide measure is quite impossible, and fair
comparisons are elusive. Both resources for law enforcement and the
internalization of certain norms play a central role. Furthermore, the
reasons for rule non-compliance may be so broad-ranging that such a
measure, even were it possible, would be practically meaningless.
These internal critiques underlie the central diagnosis of law’s
ineffectiveness in Latin America. This repertoire of legal arguments,
in effect, is projected as the external description of Latin American
legal systems as a whole. As such, the charge of formalism is not
simply directed at a line of conservative constitutional opinions, but
rather it becomes a problem of the whole legal culture. The law in
action is not simply a way of privatizing areas of commercial law,
but rather it marks the irrelevance of the whole of state law.
European transnationalism is not simply a mode of legal reasoning,
but a mark of cultural inappositeness of the social system that is law
and its exclusivity to a racial and cultural minority in the region. In
short, the architects of development transnationalism have projected
these ordinarily legal-political moves as an operational diagnosis.
This rendering supports proposals for law reform and institutional redesign. Projects are more easily advanced. Absent a functioning law,
replacement or substitution appears not only desirable but also
necessary.
Over time, these particular explanations and diagnoses buttressing
particular projects of law reform or funding assistance have
consolidated a standing narrative about law in Latin America. The
amalgamation of these mutually reinforcing descriptions has the
effect of casting legal systems in the region as effectively incapable
of performing the functions expected of modern law. These enduring
views have ripened into an identity or common understanding of the
workings of law in the region. The shortcomings identified and the
failings decried paint a permanent picture of failure. As noted
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already, the elements of this diagnosis cannot be reversed through
simple law reform. They are constantly observable features of liberal
legal systems. Moreover, these internal critiques passing as
diagnosis, while insights of jurisprudence on the workings and
assumptions of liberal legalism, are routine tactical moves within
legal politics. They are available to advance endless proposals. Thus,
as failings of the legal system to be rectified and fixed, success is
never achievable. Their endogeneity to liberal law is what makes
them continually available as justifications for new reforms.

III. CRITIQUES OF THE NEW INTERPRETATION
Many positive things may be said for interpretationism, as it
supports a progressive political direction advanced by constitutional
adjudication. It has enlisted a broad array of talented scholars
participating in debates over law and legal theory. It has deepened
the ranks of academic legal communities in many countries in Latin
America. It may be contributing, at least partially, to the perceived
need, on the part of law school administrators and political leaders,
to expand Latin America’s legal intelligentsia. The broader
intellectual community to which interpretationists contribute fills an
important function in the legitimation of law at a national level.
At the same time, the particular structure and conceptions
mobilized by interpretationism may produce some negative and
unintended effects. The discussion below considers some of these
points. I should note that these critiques are not direct comments on
any one individual’s work. Instead, they describe aggregate features
of interpretationist discourse and their potential effects.

A. OVERSIMPLIFYING LEGAL FORMALISM
The new interpretation typically pushes off against a charge of
legal formalism. It is a principal rationale for considering and
advocating alternative legal reasoning practices. This claim without
more, at minimum, echoes the widespread diagnosis of Latin
American legal failure. It depicts local legal operators as stuck in an
earlier era of legal consciousness and thus, incapable of performing
the functions expected of contemporary legal systems, such as
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policy/principles balancing and contextual analysis.80 This generic
condemnation goes well beyond a legal realist critique of specific
judicial decisions.81
It is useful to recall Duncan Kennedy’s discussion in the U.S.
context of the two different meanings generally ascribed to legal
formalism:
In one usage, formalism is a “theory of law,” though one invented by its
adversaries rather than by any known [U.S.] proponents. Formalism in
this sense is the theory that all questions of law can be resolved by
deduction, that is, without resort to policy, except for questions arising
under rules that explicitly require policy argument. . . . [Thus] [i]n [the]
second sense, it charges an adversary either with making the mistake of
thinking that a particular abstract legal norm can generate a particular
subrule, or with a general tendency to overestimate the capacity of norms
in general to generate subrules by deduction.82

While the bulk of interpretationism does not consider conventional
local practices directly, both senses appear to be generically invoked.
Legal dogmatics—as the conventional formalism is commonly
known—is automatically regarded as both wrong and
unconvincing.83 In this regard, there is significant agreement across
the various national discussions about the nature of conventional
legal thought in the region. It appears as an anachronistic sort of
classical legal thought.84 Critically missing are operative elements of
contextual analysis, or anti-formalism, capable of making the law
80. See Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought:
1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL, supra note 32, at 22-23. (The langue/parole distinction is very useful
here. The claim of this essay is that the new interpretation is likely a parole/parole
shift rather than a change of langues.)
81. See HORWITZ, supra note 57, at 193 (noting that realism was the outgrowth
of attacks on classical legal thought and that realism had a long-lasting impact on
legal thought).
82. KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 105-06.
83. See NINO, supra note 5, at 22 (dismissing legal dogmatics as ineffective at
assessing legal materials or overcoming “indeterminacies”).
84. See HORWITZ, supra note 57, at 4-5 (attacking classical legal thought as
inadequate to address the inconsistencies between the common law and the
“individualistic premises of a self-executing market economy” which had become
part of the American social construct); KARST & ROSENN, supra note 61, at 58 (reemphasizing that the gap between the written law and practiced law was partly due
to factors such as idealism and formalism).
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more responsive to local conditions and national policy goals.85
Certainly, the outward aesthetics of conventional legal reasoning
in Latin America can appear overly abstract, positivist, or
theoretical.86 Moreover, it is widely described as outwardly opaque
and lacking in local context.87 Its elements often consist of
continental European citations, conceptualist hierarchies, and
deductivist logic.88 Still, as noted above, this mode serves as the
mode of legal reasoning and meaning-making in legal communities
across the region. Moreover, European-inflected legal dogmatics has
not completely eluded transnational engagement with U.S. legal
culture.89 In the area of constitutional law, for example, U.S. legal
sources, if often through the intermediation of European authors,
have been particularly salient.90 Admittedly, Anglo-American
authorities have not historically constituted the primary language of
legal reasoning or the main referents of legal discourse. Nonetheless,
a defining element of law in Latin America is its permeability to
European and U.S. sources.91
85. See Esquirol, supra note 63, at 104, 112-13.
86. On the aesthetics of law, see generally Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of
American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1050-51 (2002) (introducing “the forms,
images, tropes, perceptions, and sensibilities” that shape the creation of American
law, including grid, energy, perspectivist, and dissociative aesthetics).
87. See, e.g., Keith S. Rosenn, The Jeito: Brazil’s Institutional Bypass of the
Formal Legal System and its Developmental Implications, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 514,
529-31 (1971) (noting that jurists and scholars rarely debate the “economic, social,
political, or administrative” aspects of legislation; rather, debates focus on which
universal principles the law ought to incorporate).
88. Esquirol, supra note 63, at 59.
89. This engagement, however, may be rather one-sided. See, e.g., Garro, supra
note 8, at 598 (lamenting Latin American law’s exclusion from U.S. comparative
law courses).
90. See Jacob Dolinger, The Influence of American Constitutional Law on the
Brazilian Legal System, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 803, 805 (1990) (giving several
examples of U.S. influence on Brazilian public law, including one case in which a
Brazilian Supreme Court Justice cited Marbury v. Madison); Jonathan Miller,
Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability: A Sociology of the U.S. Model and its
Collapse in Argentina, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 77, 99-100 (1997)
(noting the strong influence of the U.S. Constitution on original Argentine
constitutionalism, especially judicial review).
91. See MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 9, at 5 (pointing out, for
example, that both the U.S. and Latin American legal traditions have their origin in
European law). Indeed this view is pervasive throughout comparative scholarship.
But see generally Esquirol, supra note 10, at 427 (critiquing comparativist, René
David’s, reading of Latin American law as European).
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The new interpretation thus paints a very incomplete picture, if
much of any picture at all, of dominant legal practices in Latin
American countries. It under-theorizes the actual practices of
national courts and their commentators. In their place, it substitutes a
generic image of legal formalism, piggy-backing on the development
diagnosis. However, this characterization understates the ways in
which existing practices further specific interests over others and
serve to distribute resources.92 It also discounts a present political and
social context that impacts legal reasoning, thereby contributing to its
construction.93 Additionally, it underestimates the practical
responsiveness of local legal reasoning to foreign legal developments
and trends in light of its receptiveness to comparative law and
foreign sources.
This argument is not a defense of any particular line of legal
reasoning labeled formalist in any particular case in any particular
legal community in Latin America. Rather, it suggests that the new
interpretation’s depiction of “formalism” is rather incomplete.
Further, the quest for a countervailing anti-formalist decisionmaking, to the extent it signifies contextually aware and purposive
action, may be somewhat misdirected.94 It may undermine its very
ability to stand for law.

B. SIDE-STEPPING LEGAL REALISM
In their opposition to formalism, interpretationists appear to make
a legal realist critique. However, their interventions consist of both
more and less than legal realism.95 It is more in that interpretationists
draw on the ambient image of Latin American legal failure. This
reference extends beyond a critique of unconvincing legal analysis in
a particular case, line of cases, or legal area. It is also more than the
92. See Esquirol, supra note 58, at 731-32 (concluding that the “U.S.-Latin
American legal transnationalism is . . . privileged” and does not fully take into
account all locally available legal and political options, frustrating local legal
institutions).
93. See Esquirol, supra note 10, at 463-64 (noting that much comparative
scholarship on Latin America has suppressed “societal particularity” and focused
instead on the “European character” of the region’s law).
94. Cf. Esquirol, supra note 63, at 107-08 (noting the reclamation of formalism
as “authentic” by some progressive Latin American legal scholars in reaction to
“the legacy of failed developmentalism” of earlier decades).
95. See generally KENNEDY, supra note 4.
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sum of observations that law in any one area is out of step with social
norms. Rather, it casts the whole of national legal culture, including
legal reasoning, cases, and norms, as unconvincing to and
disconnected from the societies that have generated them. This
pervasive diagnosis of law in the region rests on a variety of internal
critiques of liberal legalism turned into external evaluations of law in
Latin America as a whole, as has been described already. This
generalized view has not only been a principal catalyst for
internationally assisted law reform, but it is also a common feature
within national legal politics. In this context, the new interpretation is
driven by this hyper-realist generalization of liberal legalism’s failure
in Latin America.
Thus, rather than developing a sustained legal realist analysis of
specific cases or doctrinal arguments—whether of the positions of
traditionalists or neo-constitutionalism—interpretationists appear
more drawn to the well-accepted diagnosis of Latin American legal
failure for their impetus, with formalism as one of its standard
characteristics. Discussing the reception of interpretationism in Latin
America, Diego Lopez Medina notes:
[O]ne could also realize that the jurisprudential discourse in Latin
America tends on occasion to separate more clearly between jurisprudes
and non-jurisprudes than what it separates between formalists and nonformalists. We will discover, then, a continuous effort on the part of
sophisticated lawyers-jurisprudes to undo the much more traditionalist
positions of the professional lawyer, little concerned with the theoretical
foundations of the law. When that happens, all sorts of jurisprudential
positions (either formalist or anti-formalist) are situated to the left (to the
critical side) of the standard legal theory. 96

Indeed, legal realism of this heightened, unrelenting kind is
already well-entrenched within the perception of Latin Americans
and in the eyes of transnational observers, especially on the
shortcomings of liberal law. Its prominence can be seen as
underwriting a large part of the generalized image of law’s failure in
the region. It simply restates and confirms these common views.
At the same time, however, the new interpretation is also less than
legal realist critique. It puts a great amount of faith in transnational
96. MEDINA, supra note 12, at 83-84.
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reconstructive proposals for liberal law. It ignores the equally
formalist character of these new interpretive theories, at least in the
eyes of their critics.97 As such, the new interpretation is not a realist
intervention. It is propelled by both a hyper-realist view of Latin
American legal practices and a faith in liberal law elsewhere. In this
arena of legal politics, the reference to formalism for
interpretationists appears synonymous with conventional Latin
American legal reasoning practices. It substitutes for specific
critiques of legal reasoning in particular cases or areas. It also
sidesteps the work of showing the unconvincingness of particular
legal practices. Rather, it rests on the generalized negative perception
of law in Latin America as the justification for new methods. Antiformalism signifies alternative, presumably operationally effective
forms of transnationally recognized methods of legal interpretation.

C. IDEALIZING TRANSNATIONAL THEORIES
At the other end of the equation, new interpretationists propose a
range of transnational methods and theories, presumably more
responsive to local realities, while still resistant to judicial
manipulation. The alternative theories called upon typically focus on
common law judges, fundamental rights, constitutional decisions,
and reasoned judicial opinions.98 Anglo-American sources and others
influenced by legal realism are attractive to Latin American
“interpretationists.” While the former are generally reconstructivist
proposals in their home contexts, they nonetheless generally
incorporate and attempt to respond to a critique of classical legal
formalism. They eschew simple deduction, while at the same time
rebutting legal realism. Moreover, they generally are committed to
professing liberal legalism’s success, while ignoring or defending
97. See KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 294 (arguing that “the apologetic motive or
intent has inflected Liberal representations of legal institutions and regimes,
falsifying or distorting the analyses” through their “denial of the ideological in
adjudication and of the contradictory nature of the legal regimes produced by
judicial law making” and suggesting that “the best we can or should hope for is [a]
chastened theory”).
98. Compare DWORKIN, supra note 22, at 1-6 (stressing the importance of
looking at common law judges and their decisions as mechanisms for “social
revolution”), with ALEXY, supra note 25, at 6-7 (downplaying individual judge’s
decisions and emphasizing that a series of “value-judgments” is necessary to
establish normative policy).
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against significant variation from the ideal. The bulk of new
interpretation thus draws on reconstructive proposals for liberal law.
More virulent critiques of these same reconstructive proposals are
generally eclipsed, perhaps as too destructive of the possibilities for
interpretive discourse, whose legitimization of actual legal and
judicial practices is the main objective.
Thus, beyond rejecting legal formalism, interpretationists propose
alternatives. They tend to over-idealize possible solutions to the
inherent contradictions of liberal law, such as subjectivity and
objectivity, politics and neutrality, indeterminacy and necessity.99
The new interpretation draws heavily on authors from the global
North claiming to have surmounted these difficulties. Yet the
structural aspiration within liberal law to objectivity, neutrality, and
apolitical-ness are both endemic and insoluble. In practice, they are
alleviated only through a combination of tentative proposals, wishful
thinking, political legitimation, and ideological belief sustained by
specific legal communities to varying degrees.
This quick snapshot does not require, nor would it be possible, to
prove in detail that any transnational interpretation theory fails to
satisfy its own claims. There are those who would argue that, indeed,
interpretation discourse only produces levels of convincingness for
some people at some times.100 Nor is it necessary here to determine
whether any transnational interpretative theory is faithfully applied in
the global North. For my purposes, it suffices to note that while no
individual theory of interpretation is universally convincing, this
field of discourse generally sustains the notion that legal
interpretation is in fact an achievable enterprise in keeping with the
claims of liberal law. In this regard, it may be said that theorizing
about legal interpretation serves an important function in modern
systems of law: it can be used to present local legal reasoning
practices as a distinct, apolitical, objective, and neutral mode of
decision-making. A fuller discussion of the function of legal
interpretation discourse within the political economy of modern legal
systems is beyond the scope of this Essay. My purpose here is
99. See UNGER, supra note 27, at 203-205, 230 (suggesting that these
contradictions and oppositions are “fundamental qualities of the self,” and
“indeterminacy, consciousness, practicality, and objectivity” are intertwined).
100. See generally KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 264-96 (tracing various
interpretations of the role of adjudication in applying social theory).

2011]

LEGAL INTERPRETATION IN LATIN AMERICA

1065

accomplished, though, by simply noting the legitimating role this
dimension of law can usefully play.
As such, interpretationist discourse, to the extent it principally
draws on these texts, heavily relies on the legal ideology of the
communities where they are produced.101 Absent a similar context of
legitimation, local implementation of such theories does not
guarantee any significant discursive or operational effect. Quite
likely, the new interpretation will run the same negative fate as
perceived of law generally in the region. It will look equally deficient
in application under the withering gaze habitually cast on law in
Latin America.
Indeed, critiques of legal formalism could surface against the new
interpretation. The development objection to conventional Latin
American practice condemns the prominence of foreign legal sources
and the resulting gap vis-à-vis local societies. Their outward
foreignness buttresses the critique of a legal formalism disconnected
from social reality. This perceived problem might be no more
remedied through the “new interpretation.” To maintain the
appearance of legitimacy and law-like nature, it is not unlikely that
interpretationists may turn to ever more disconnected presentations
of transnational theory and methods. Similar to the role played by
European legal sources, the purpose would be to present legal
authority separate and distinct from local politics. This mode of
legitimizing new practices would invite other rounds of critique,
asserting the new interpretation’s own legal formalism and
inappropriately transplanted nature.
The new interpretation already shares many of the same
characteristics of traditional legal doctrine in the region, albeit with
101. See STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 1 (1980); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF
LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 86-87 (2004) (determining that rule of law
“does not produce a single right answer,” and this indeterminacy theory allows
judges to make decisions based on information other than legal principles);
William S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element in Statutory
Interpretation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 629, 632-33 (2001) (debating how legislation
can be interpreted both narrowly and broadly, and legal theory requires
interpretation from these types of “extrinsic sources”); Duncan Kennedy, Freedom
and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC.
518, 518 (1986) (assessing conflicts of law and the proper outcomes in cases as the
types of questions legal reasoning must answer).
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different sources. Whereas continental European authorities were the
primary materials before now, it is rather more adjudication-focused
Anglo-American jurists that are prominent. Not unlike European
transnationalism, though, it is not uncommon for a Latin American
scholar to become identified with a particularly well-known theorist
and become his/her local champion within local debates. There is
room for any number of misreadings and localized renditions of the
foreign scholar.102 Local exponents of foreign authors may indeed
advance, reject, or re-combine different legal and theoretical
proposals. In this way, the new interpretation fits within the mold of
European transnationalism, although with more Anglo-American
sources.

D. LOSING LEGAL CAPITAL
Generally, legal and institutional reform under the umbrella of
development transnationalism undermines a significant amount of
existing legal capital, or acquis légaux.103 Worthwhile legal policies
and institutional forms may be easily, if not automatically, rejected
through this formula. A wholesale switch to different processes with
different discursive landmarks and constraints adds significant costs.
However, without a clear definition of the policy changes and
distributional consequences sought, a different legal institutional
model may not fare any better. Indeed, as a result of the limitations
of liberal law, the same failures will likely re-appear. It is not
possible here to discuss the array of legal capital existing within legal
systems in Latin America. Briefly, though, they consist in part of the
accumulated social investment in law and legal institutions over
time, such as training the legal profession in certain modes of
procedure and discourses of argumentation. Additionally, they also
can include particular political positions or policy combinations
enshrined in law that, as a result of the development formula for
reform, are never openly considered as real alternatives.
102. See Duncan Kennedy, Prólogo [Preface] to MEDINA, supra note 12, at xi,
xiii (discussing the author’s novel explanation of the canons of legal reasoning
theory in its multiple interpretations within the local context of readers that choose
to read and interpret the texts with their own “creative” needs in mind).
103. See Esquirol, supra note 26, at 77 (explaining that the failure of legal
reform occurs because these reforms “purport to redress . . . a combination of
features endogenous to all systems of law, problems projected on the region as a
whole, and assessments contingent on political and organizational preferences”).
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It may be that an existing policy mix, set in law in any one case,
can be counter-productive to economic development, but then again
its development-oriented reform may simply be more beneficial to
those effectively mobilizing a “development” argument. For
example, the position to reduce pro-labor legislation in Latin
American countries draws heavily on the characterization of general
legal failure in the labor regime. Specifically cited are the lack of
enforcement, limited coverage, and cooptation of unions by
government, or in other words, lawlessness, the gap between law on
the books and law in action, and official corruption. Discrediting
national law assists in making the case for reforms. More concretely,
however, real questions of policy are in play over job security,
workers’ rights, medical benefits, and the like. The sum of such
reforms will shape the national political economy. Much of this
discussion and debate, however, is waged only indirectly. It is
obscured by the logic of development. Rather than confront the
stakes more directly, attention is directed to rectify purportedly
broken legal systems when policy changes and distributional reallocations are the real issues at stake.
Another example is the mix of defendants’ rights and state
enforcement powers in the areas of criminal procedure. The detailed
question of specific rights at different stages of the proceedings and
the appropriate mix in particular countries take a back seat to the
juggernaut of transforming procedure from the traditional
inquisitorial to the development adversarial. This example
particularly highlights the impact of the widely reviled “inquisitorial”
model linked to Latin America, branded the cause of evils ranging
from human rights abuses to non-enforcement, impunity, secrecy,
corruption, and undemocratic behavior. However, the mere
substitution of adversarial for inquisitorial obscures the policy
questions that re-calibrating criminal procedure entails. More orality
of instruction and shifting discretion from the judge to the public
prosecutor will not eliminate the intrinsic tensions between political
independence and official accountability, defendant rights versus
state enforcement powers, and positive law and social behavior.
In the context of interpretationism, the legal capital at risk is the
status of law and legal reasoning. Despite the accumulated charges of
failure and formalism, the legal dogmatics of the region retains its
law-like quality, at least as compared to proposals framed as anti-
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formalism commonly championed by interpretationists. Indeed, the
danger of anti-formalism is that it could cease to be recognized as
law.104 Approached as merely a technical enterprise, the new
interpretation would solely introduce new variables or techniques.
However, with no clear set of constraints on such new variables, its
skeptics assert that legal reasoning could simply become pure
discretion.105 Dressed up as principles or policies, for example, legal
decision-makers could make the law say whatever they decided. The
trick is to invest the principles or policies with enough meaning, or
limitation of meaning, to provide some constraint against just any
outcome. It is not clear that the adoption of any one proposal for
greater pragmatism or context could withstand charges of
instrumentalism. No single anti-formal device can defend against
such critiques unless it stands side-by-side with a normalizing
discourse, produced by a critical mass of faithful supporters insisting
on its legitimacy and practicability.
As a result, the all-purpose diagnosis of Latin American failure
can be turned against new constitutional and other legal
constructions by opponents claiming these too are instances of a
failed law, if not for their excessive formalism then for their
unconstrained arbitrariness. The stage is set for subsequent rounds of
challenges and critiques in this same way, available to political
antagonists who can automatically and without much specificity
claim the misapplication and manipulation of these new methods.
Any such deformation is especially easy to link to their Latin
American application, intoning the well-consolidated diagnosis of
law’s failure in these countries. At the same time, this picture
downplays the general shortcomings of interpretation everywhere
and the accompanying body of ideological legitimation that
104. The first phase of law and development has been generally described as
shipwrecking on this very point. See James Gardiner, LEGAL IMPERIALISM:
AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA (1981); see also
Miller, supra note 90, at 94-95, 155 (describing the de-legitimating impact on the
Argentine Supreme Court of interpretive methods based on mere “charismatic”
assertions).
105. See Ronaldo Porto Macedo, Jr., Interpretation of Good Faith in Brazilian
Contracts: The Legal Principles in a Relational Approach (2010) (presented at the
XVIIIth International Congress of the International Academy for Comparative
Law, Washington, D.C., July 2010) (on file with American University
International Law Review).
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successful practices require. Indeed, supporting the current wave of
neo-constitutionalism has meant suppressing the knowledge that the
right methods, to the extent that the instrumental belief guides
participants in legal interpretation debates, are not a technical but a
political question. Moreover, it has meant adopting the framework of
Latin American legal failure as a convenient springboard for
supporting substantive legal changes.

E. DEEPENING LEGAL FAILURE
The new interpretation may simply reinforce the background
paradigm of failure and undermine the normalization of legal
governance that most of its exponents desire. The field outwardly
rests on the assumption that the right mix of interpretive methods can
exist, and it is projected as operating effectively in the global North.
However, this framing misperceives an important facet of
interpretation discourse, either unconsciously or instrumentally. This
dimension of law is not simply about achieving any particular
interpretive technique. Rather it is a broad commitment to the
deployment of interpretive discourse to legitimate judicial
lawmaking and legal reasoning. It operates through the instrumental
fiction of correct methods of interpretation and correct applications
of method, consisting in debate, ultimate adoption, and subsequent
revision of the correct meaning. However, retaining the optic of
hyper-realist critique trained onto Latin America, a feature of the
legal failure diagnosis, any interpretation locally is subject not only
to critiques of incorrectness in method and application but also to
constant charges of deformation and manipulation. It turns out to be
a quite precarious mode of defending outcomes based on legal
reasoning, assuming that is one’s purpose of course.
In this light, the new interpretation can be seen as premised on a
skewed representation of conventional Latin American practice, as
well as transnational theories of interpretation. The transnational
theories enjoy a wide degree of legitimacy from their home
ideological contexts and as prestigious transnational theory.106 The
Latin American practice is continually discredited as a legal failure.
As such, this framework sustains an image of a successful
reconstructive practice of liberal law in the global North contrasted
106. Flores, supra note 2.
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against its continually failed version in Latin America. It draws from
and simultaneously reinforces the paradigm of the West’s success
and Latin America’s failure.
The continual re-instantiation and normalization of this image
undermines the credibility of national systems in Latin America.
Additionally, the non-recognition of the various ways in which
existing modes of legal reasoning already incorporate some of the
elements purportedly found missing relegates Latin American
interpretive practices to perpetual discredit. It also appears to
disassociate public and academic discourse from the function of
legitimation of much actual legal practice in Latin America. 107
Transnational alternatives become overly idealized as actually
capable of producing uncontroversial operational results. Thus, while
theories of legal interpretation are defended as appropriate decisionmaking, the practice of legal interpretation in Latin America may be
serially de-legitimized.
Troublingly, as a significant dynamic for legal change, the failure
trope seriously debilitates and undermines law as a social system.
Pursuing reform in this way is counter-productive. First, it
undermines the legal system unduly by continually denigrating it
systematically for the mere purpose of ushering in legal reform.
These reforms are equally liberal legal forms subject to the same
failings previously diagnosed. Second, it occludes potential
alternatives and values in pre-reform law not openly evaluated, as
well as other options different than interpretationist discourse
practiced in the current way. In short, reconstructive interventions in
liberal law, as practiced in the global North, cannot redress the
shortcomings of law perceived in Latin America. Rather than merely
rebutting legal realism, interpretationists must re-construct against a
crushing background of systemic legal failure. This idea goes well
beyond proposals for more neutral principles analysis, policy
balancing, or legal process. Instead, it requires confronting the
107. For scholarship drawing attention to actual local practices of interpretation,
see generally Jorge González Jácome, El Problema de las Fuentes del Derecho:
Una Perspectiva desde la Argumentación Jurídica [The Problem of the Sources of
Law: A Legal Reasoning Perspective], 112 VNIVERSITAS 265 (2006) (Colom.)
(discussing how Colombian judges choose legal modes to legitimate their rulings
based on the legal environment, rather than basing their decisions on one doctrine
or source of law).
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diagnosis of failure, making fair comparisons, and having realistic
expectations of liberal law and legal systems.

CONCLUSION
The limitations of legal interpretation are too difficult to deny in
Latin America. Some may see this as proof of the reality of liberal
law’s failure in the region. Yet, perhaps it is also due to the lack of a
sufficiently vast and disciplining liberal legal ideology exerting
dominance. The new interpretation appears as a positive
development. It has invigorated the scholarly community and the
public to engage questions of legal governance. It incorporates new
sources within the traditional scheme of continental European
authorities. It also focuses on new questions, principally operational
methods and approaches.
However, the new interpretation may also be unwittingly
reproducing a narrative of perpetual Latin American legal failure. It
is premised on the common diagnosis of failed Latin American legal
practices and, by contrast, successful first world transplants and best
practices as models for reform. This construct significantly
misrepresents actual practice both in Latin America and elsewhere.
As a result, all models can fail in the region. Indeed, the new
interpretation sustains a hyper-realist critique of Latin American
legal practices, further undermining legality at home while only
reinforcing its reconstructive possibilities elsewhere.
One could imaginably evaluate the pros and cons of this new
discursive framework as currently practiced. One could weigh, for
example, the benefits it offers progressive constitutionalism versus
its general erosion of Latin American legality. Of course, this
measurement is not really possible. Outcomes are too hard to predict,
we would likely get it wrong, and other problems of the sort.
However, considering this is not the only possible framework for
debating reform in Latin America, the particular down sides noted
here may not be a necessary part of the mix.
It may be possible to dislodge legal interpretation discourse from
its framing within the narrative of Latin American legal failure. For
example, infusing discussions with more transparently critical
versions of legal theory could serve to de-mystify the operation of
interpretive debates in the global North. This would possibly
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transform the current paradigm in Latin America, which could
potentially take very different tracks. Faith in liberal legalism
everywhere could wane, and participants in legal interpretation
debates in Latin America could lose interest in these topics. Or,
possibly, the relative faithlessness everywhere would generate a
more horizontal perspective of different national versions of legal
liberalism and maintain the utility of the discourse itself,
emphasizing the nuances of local practices. On all of these fronts,
however, much further work remains.

